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Abstract—In this paper, we present a novel distributed state 
estimation approach in networked DC microgrids to detect the 
false data injection in the microgrid control network. Each 
microgrid monitored by a distributed state estimator will detect if 
there is manipulated data received from their neighboring 
microgrids for control purposes. A dynamic model supporting the 
dynamic state estimation will be constructed for the networked 
microgrids. The optimal distributed state estimation, which is 
robust to load disturbances but sensitive to false data injected 
from neighboring microgrids will be presented. To demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the proposed approach, we simulate a 12kV 
three-bus networked DC microgrids in MATLAB/Simulink. 
Residual information corresponding to the false data injected 
from neighbors validates the efficacy of the proposed approach in 
detecting compromised agents of neighboring microgrids. 
Keywords— Networked DC Microgrids, Distributed Dynamic 
State Estimation, Cyber Intrusion Detection, False Data Injection, 
Cyber-physical Systems.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Literature Review 
Power outages can shut down critical infrastructures such as 
hospitals, water treatment plants, military services, and other 
emergency services. Financial consequences are significant. 
For example, disruptions in the U.S. electric power systems are 
estimated to be $25-70 billion annually [1]. During outages, 
microgrids can provide resilient energy service to critical 
infrastructure. While most power outages are the result of 
extreme weather events, there is increasing concern about 
outages caused by cyber-attacks [2]. Microgrids consist of 
distributed energy resources (DER) that provide power to local 
load devices. Effective operations of microgrids require 
advanced measurement, communication, and control via 
distributed controllers, sensors, actuators, and field devices. 
The measurement, communication, and control devices can be 
connected internally and externally via local area network or 
wide area network. Therefore, as a cyber-physical system 
(CPS), microgrids are particularly vulnerable to cyber-attacks 
due to their distributed nature and their critical resilience 
function. An extreme weather-induced outage may take weeks 
to restore and may cause significant economic and personal 
hardship [3]. Therefore, methodologies that improve 
microgrids’ situational awareness of cyber-attacks are 
important.  
In CPS, cyber intrusions are classified differently using 
different terms such as bias injection attack, zero dynamics 
attack, denial of service (DoS) attacks, eavesdropping attack, 
replay attack, stealthy attack, covert attack, and dynamic false 
data injection attacks [4]–[7]. However, all these attacks still 
focus on one or more components of CPS Data Confidentiality 
Integrity and Availability (CIA) triad, defined in common 
information security practices [8]. Individual types of attack 
have specific characteristics that influence the CIA-triad in 
individual ways. For example, while DoS attacks mainly affect 
the data availability, other attacks like replay, stealthy, dynamic 
false data injection and covert attacks influence data 
confidentiality and integrity. Attackers can manipulate the 
system control and management via 1) remote access to control 
system LAN network with poorly configured firewalls or 2) 
infected field devices [9]. 
As a CPS, microgrids can encounter the same types of 
attacks. DoS attacks can cause multiple issues to microgrids; 
however, once the DoS event occurs, the system operator very 
likely recognizes that the system is under attack. A more severe 
cyber-attack found in power systems is stealthy false data 
injection (FDI), where attackers corrupt the measurement 
and/or control data. In power transmission systems, the popular 
method used to detect bad measurement data is the static state 
estimator (SSE) based on weighted least squared (WLS). 
However, SSE can be manipulated by attackers if the power 
network topology is known [10]–[12]. Therefore, the cyber-
attacks stay undetected as the attack indicator 
(control/measurement residuals) of the method is kept under 
predefined detected level. SSE approaches are not only 
susceptible to advanced cyber-attack policies they may also not 
be applicable for microgrids as there are more dynamical 
interactions among loads, generation, and distribution devices 
in microgrids.  
There are methods for detecting FDI in microgrids in 
literature [13]–[17]. Recent relevant literature for FDI in 
microgrid can be found as follows: [13] investigated the FDI 
detection for consensus control of DC microgrids utilizing 
unknown input observer; however, the microgrid network 
model is described as quasi-static. Therefore, dynamic 
interactions within the microgrid can be omitted as the 
inductive interactions among devices are ignored. [14] 
proposed using invariants as fixed boundaries of voltages and 
currents without depending on the system model to detect the 
anomalies in a distributed control system of a DC microgrid; 
however; in many cases, a deviated voltage information, which 
still stays within the safety limit can arbitrarily drive the system 
into instability.  
 
B. Research Contributions  
In this paper, we 1) propose a novel optimal state estimation 
technique for FDI method in networked DC microgrids, 2) 
employ a dynamic model of the microgrid instead of the 
normally-used quasi-static model of DC microgrids for the 
design of optimal estimator, and 3) the proposed method is a 
distributed algorithm. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
II elaborates the proposed distributed state estimation 
methodology for networked DC microgrids. Section III provides 
case studies, and analyzes and discusses the results. Section IV 
concludes the achievements of the paper. 
 
 
II. DISTRIBUTED STATE ESTIMATION FOR NETWORK DC 
MICROGRIDS 
In this section, the model of networked DC microgrids that 
support distributed state estimation will be elaborated. The 
model is then partitioned for our proposed distributed optimal 
state estimation. 
A. DC Microgrid Dynamic Modeling and Partitioning 
In this paper, we utilize a similar dynamic model developed in 
[18] for networked DC microgrids. The model we develop will 
include droop parameters as they are normally applied to 
control multi-terminal microgrids [19]. The dynamics of the 
system will reveal the nature of cyber-attacks/other physical 
incidents. 
To have an equivalent model for networked DC 
microgrids, we will start with a three-bus networked DC 
microgrid as shown in Figure 1. Each microgrid can be modeled 
as an equivalent circuit with unknown internal load devices. In 
the figure, the equivalent circuit of microgrid 1 (MG1) is 
expanded for visualization. Equivalent droop control is 
implemented in each microgrid with the droop gain (𝑅𝑑1). For 
simplification, dynamics of the equivalent source 𝑉𝑔1  is 
omitted in the modeling of the system. Based on that, MG1 can 
be modeled dynamically as follows: 
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where  
𝜏1 = −
𝑅𝑑1 + 𝑅1
𝐿1
 , 𝜏12 = −
𝑅12
𝐿12
, 𝜏13 = −
𝑅13
𝐿13
. 
(1) is the representation for MG1 coupling with MG2 and MG3. 
However, every microgrid can be generalized as a microgrid 𝑖, 
which interconnects with its neighbor 𝑗 (𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑁𝑗 ). The 
dynamic model of the a microgrid 𝑖 in the network is shown as 
?̇?𝑖 = 𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝐵𝑐𝑖𝑢𝑖 + 𝐸𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑖
𝑗=1
+ 𝑤𝑖  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝐶𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 , (2) 
where 𝑥𝑖 is the local state vector with state matrix 𝐴𝑐𝑖, 𝑢𝑖 is the 
control input vector with control matrix 𝐵𝑐𝑖 ,  𝑑𝑖  is the 
disturbance with known disturbance structure 𝐸𝑐𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖  is the 
zero-mean process noise with covariance matrix 𝑄𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖  is the 
measurement output, and 𝑣𝑖  is the zero-mean measurement 
noise with covariance matrix 𝑅𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is the coupling states of 
neighbor 𝑗 with coupled-state matrix 𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑗 .  
Take the three-bus networked microgrid as an example, the 
local state for MG1, 𝑥1 = [𝑉1, 𝐼𝑔1, 𝐼12, 𝐼13]
𝑇
. The control 
variable, 𝑢1 = 𝑉𝑔1, the disturbance, 𝑑1 = 𝐼𝐿1, the measurement 
𝑦1 = [𝑉1, 𝐼𝑔1, 𝐼12, 𝐼13]
𝑇
, and the neighboring states 𝑥1,𝑗=1 = 𝑉2, 
𝑥1,𝑗=2 = 𝑉3 . The representation of the matrix components is 
detailed in the Appendix. 
To detect the false data injected from neighbors, the 
neighboring states 𝑥𝑖𝑗  will be referred to as additional inputs of 
system (2). Therefore, (2) can be rewritten as 
 
Figure 1. Representation of a three-bus DC microgrid circuit. 
?̇?𝑖 = 𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝐵𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑢𝑥𝑖 + 𝐸𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖  + 𝑤𝑖  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝐶𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 , (3) 
where  𝐵𝑐𝑥𝑖 = [𝐵𝑐𝑖  𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑗], 𝑢𝑥𝑖 = [𝑢𝑖
𝑇 , (𝑥𝑖𝑗)
𝑇
]
𝑇
.  
In the discrete domain, the system state is expressed as 
𝑥𝑖,𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑘 + 𝐵𝑥𝑖𝑢𝑥𝑖,𝑘 + 𝐸𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑘  + 𝑤𝑖,𝑘  
𝑦𝑖,𝑘 = 𝐶𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑘 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑘. (4) 
This partitioned state-space system architecture will be utilized 
for the optimal state estimator proposed in the next sub-section. 
B. Distributed Optimal State Estimation 
The proposed distributed optimal estimator for the three-bus 
example is shown in Figure 2. Each agent (A1, A2, or A3) 
exchange information 𝑥𝑖𝑗  (bus voltage) with each other for the 
bus-voltage control purpose (Figure 3). Any agent or 
communication channel can be the target of cyber-attack. For 
example, A2 is compromised and start sending the false 
information to A1 and A3 to in order to disrupt the cyber-
physical system.  
An optimal state estimation that rejects the effects of 
unknown disturbances for detecting faults in a single control 
system was proposed in [20]. However, the method has not 
been analyzed for cyber-attack detection. In this paper, a 
distributed optimal estimation method is proposed for 
distributed FDI detection method. In this case, each distributed 
agent 𝐴𝑖  ( 𝑖 = 1,2,3 ) performs a distributed optimal state 
estimation (5) with information exchanged with their 
neighbors.  
𝑧𝑖,𝑘+1 = 𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1𝑧𝑖,𝑘 + 𝑇𝑖𝐵𝑥𝑖(𝑢𝑥𝑖,𝑘 + 𝑓𝑢𝑖𝑗,𝑘)  + 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1𝑦𝑖,𝑘  
?̂?𝑖,𝑘+1 = 𝑧𝑖,𝑘+1 + 𝐻𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑘+1, (5) 
where 𝑎𝑢𝑖𝑗 = [0 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑇 ]
𝑇
 in which 𝑎𝑖𝑗  is the attack vector 
generated by neighbor 𝑗 . With this observer, the state 
estimation error 𝑒𝑖,𝑘+1 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑘+1 − ?̂?𝑖,𝑘+1  in agent 𝑖  can be 
expressed as 
𝑒𝑖,𝑘+1 = 𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1𝑒𝑖,𝑘 − 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1 𝑣𝑖,𝑘 − 𝐻𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑘+1 
+(𝐼 − 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖)𝑤𝑖 − (𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1 − (𝐼 − 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖)𝐴𝑖 + 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1 𝐶𝑖)𝑥𝑖,𝑘 
+(𝐼 − 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖)𝐸𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑘 − [𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
2 − 𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1𝐻𝑖]𝑦𝑘  
−[𝑇𝑖 − (𝐼 − 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖)]𝐵𝑥𝑖𝑢𝑥𝑖,𝑘 − 𝑇𝑖𝐵𝑥𝑖𝑎𝑢𝑖𝑗,𝑘 ,  (6) 
where 𝐾𝑖,𝑘 = 𝐾𝑖,𝑘
1 + 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
2 .  
 
Define the following conditions: 
(𝐼 − 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖)𝐸𝑖 = 0 
𝑇𝑖 − (𝐼 − 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖) = 0 
𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1 − (𝐼 − 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖)𝐴𝑖 + 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1 𝐶𝑖 = 0 
𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
2 − 𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1𝐻𝑖 = 0, (7) 
Solutions of (7) if exist will be 
𝐻𝑖 = 𝐸𝑖[(𝐶𝑖𝐸𝑖)
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝐸𝑖]
−1(𝐶𝑖𝐸𝑖)
𝑇 
𝑇𝑖 = (𝐼 − 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖) 
𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1 = (𝐼 − 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖)𝐴𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1 𝐶𝑖 
𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
2 = 𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1𝐻𝑖 , 
(8a) 
(8b) 
 (8c) 
(8d) 
where 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1  needs to be found for the stable and optimal 
observer. If these conditions hold, (6) will become  
 
Figure 3. Optimal state estimation for distributed estimator 𝑖. 
 
Figure 2. Distributed state estimation architecture in cyber-physical systems 
(networked microgrid), where a control agent is compromised. 
𝑒𝑖,𝑘+1 = 𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1𝑒𝑖,𝑘 − 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1 𝑣𝑖,𝑘 − 𝐻𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑘+1 
+𝑇𝑖𝑤𝑖 − 𝑇𝑖𝐵𝑥𝑖𝑎𝑢𝑖𝑗,𝑘.  (9) 
Based on this relationship, define the variance of 𝑒𝑖,𝑘+1 as 
𝑃𝑖,𝑘+1, where 
𝑃𝑖,𝑘+1 = 𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1𝑃𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1
𝑇 + 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1 𝑅𝑖,𝑘𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1𝑇  
−𝐻𝑖𝑅𝑖,𝑘+1𝐻𝑖
𝑇 + 𝑇𝑖𝑄𝑖,𝑘+1𝑇𝑖
𝑇 − 𝑇𝑖𝐵𝑥𝑖𝑆𝑢𝑖𝑗,𝑘(𝑇𝑖𝐵𝑥𝑖)
𝑇 .  (10) 
The parameter 𝑆𝑢𝑖𝑗,𝑘 is the unknown variance of 𝑎𝑢𝑖𝑗,𝑘. 
Therefore, without the attack, the variance will become  
𝑃𝑖,𝑘+1 = 𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1𝑃𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1
𝑇 + 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1 𝑅𝑖,𝑘𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1𝑇  
−𝐻𝑖𝑅𝑖,𝑘+1𝐻𝑖
𝑇 + 𝑇𝑖𝑄𝑖,𝑘+1𝑇𝑖
𝑇 .  (11) 
Therefore, the optimal observer can be achieved via 
minimization of 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑃𝑖,𝑘+1) with respect to 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1𝑇 .  
Min
𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒((𝑃𝑖,𝑘+1))) the estimator will be independent of 
disturbance, least dependent on measurement noise, and 
sensitive to the attack. 𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1  can be found as 
𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1 = (𝐼 − 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖)𝐴𝑖𝑃𝑖,𝑘𝐶𝑖
𝑇(𝐶𝑖𝑃𝑖,𝑘𝐶𝑖
𝑇 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑘)
−1
. (12) 
Therefore, the optimal observer parameters are iteratively 
obtained via (8), (11), and (12). 
From (9), the residual 𝑟𝑖,𝑘 = 𝑦𝑖,𝑘 − ?̂?𝑖,𝑘 generated from 
the optimal observer will be 
𝑟𝑖,𝑘 = 𝐶𝑖𝑒𝑖,𝑘+1 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑘 
𝑟𝑖,𝑘 = 𝐶𝑖𝐹𝑖,𝑘+1𝑒𝑖,𝑘 + (𝐼 − 𝐶𝑖𝐾𝑖,𝑘+1
1 )𝑣𝑖,𝑘 − 𝐶𝑖𝐻𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑘+1 
+𝐶𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑤𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖𝑇𝑖𝐵𝑥𝑖𝑎𝑢𝑖𝑗,𝑘. (13) 
Therefore, 𝑟𝑖,𝑘 is most sensitive to the attack vector 𝑎𝑢𝑖𝑗,𝑘 and 
can be used to detect the attack event. In the next section, case 
studies will validate the feature of the proposed algorithm. 
III. CASE STUDIES  
To demonstrate the proposed method, we utilize a 3-bus 12-kV 
DC system model. Each bus contains a microgrid, which has 
identical parameters shown in Table I. Each microgrid is rated 
at 50 MW and has an equivalent droop parameter of 5%. 
Process and measurement noise variances are shown in the 
Appendix. 
 
 
Table I. 12-kV DC Microgrid i’s parameters with interconnecting parameters 
Symbol Description Value 
𝑅𝑖 Equivalent internal resistance 0.05 Ω 
𝐿𝑖 Equivalent internal inductance 3 mH 
𝐶𝑖 Equivalent output capacitance 10 µF 
𝑅𝑖𝑗 Line resistance 0.1 Ω 
𝐿𝑖𝑗 Line inductance 0.5 mH 
 
 
Figure 4. load profile of one MG. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Distributed estimator 1’s performance against load disturbance. 
(a)
𝑥𝑘 ?̂?𝑘
(b)
Based on the parameters, we perform the following 
simulation case. We assume that a cyber attacker compromises 
distributed controller of MG2 and MG3 then sends false voltage 
data to MG1 at 6s and 4s with the corresponding biases of 100 
V and 150 V, respectively. In this case, the load of each MG 
has a large range of current variation as shown in Figure 4. 
Estimated current and voltage of MG1 are shown in Figure 5. 
Residuals are shown in Figure 6. At 8s, the loads of MGs 
increase their current consumption by 2000 A. 
As seen in Figure 5, the optimal state estimator eliminates 
the effect of load disturbance as prior to the attack events at 4s, 
the estimated values track the measured value. The residual 
indicators in Figure 6 also show the zero-mean residuals before 
4s. 
The first attack conducted by MG3 at 4s is detected as the 
estimated current (Figure 5b) 𝐼13  start to deviate from the 
measured current 𝐼13 . This is also shown in the residual 
component 𝑟𝐼13 = 𝐼13 − 𝐼13  as it changes to a non-zero 
component at 4s. As the current 𝐼13  represents the coupling 
between MG1 and MG3, the MG1 could infer that the attack 
was conducted by MG3. Similarly, Figure 5b also shows that 
the estimated 𝐼12 starts deviating from the measured current 𝐼12 
at 6s. On the other hand, the residual 𝑟𝐼12 = 𝐼12 − 𝐼12 
representing the coupling between MG1 and MG2 changes to a 
non-zero residual. This proves the attack at 6s originates from 
MG2.  
At 8s, the load changes cause the increased consumption 
current and made the bus voltage drop; however, the residuals 
remained constant. This prove that the load disturbance at 8s is 
totally decoupled from the cyber-attacks.  
Therefore, the proposed method effectively detects the 
attack in networked DC microgrids and is robust to load 
disturbance. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a novel distributed state estimation 
methodology to detect cyber-attacks in distributed networked 
microgrids. A dynamic model was utilized for attack detection. 
Each MG will have the capability to detect compromised 
neighbor so that the control system can be informed for the 
system reconfiguration and attacks isolation. We demonstrated 
the proposed method in a three-bus microgrid network. 
APPENDIX 
The model of MG1 and its coupling part is as: 
𝐴1 =
[
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0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
] , 𝐴1,𝑗=2 =
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1
𝐿13]
 
 
 
 
, 𝐴1,𝑗=1 =
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0
−
1
𝐿12
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𝑄
1
= 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3, 𝑞4}, 𝑅1 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{𝑟1, 𝑟2, 𝑟3, 𝑟4}, (14) 
where 𝑛1 is the size of the state matrix 𝐴1 , 𝑚1 is the number of 
measurements, and 𝑞1- 𝑞4 and 𝑟1- 𝑟4 are the variances of the 
process and measurement noise. Using the parameters indicated 
in Table I, parameters in (14) can be calculated except the 
variances. The process noise and measurement noise variances 
are assumed and calculated as 
 
𝑄1 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{10,10,10,10}, 𝑅1 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{100,100,10,10}. 
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